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Abstract
The object of study is cooperation in joint projects, where agents may have dif-
ferent desired sophistication levels for the project, and where some of the agents
may have low budgets. In this context questions concerning the optimal real-
izable sophistication level and the distribution of the related costs among the
participants are tackled. A related cooperative game, the enterprise game, and a
non-cooperative game, the contribution game, are both helpful. It turns out that
there is an interesting relation between the core of the convex enterprise game
and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Special attention
is paid to a rule inspired by the airport landing fee literature. For this rule the
project is split up in a sequence of subprojects where the involved participants
pay amounts which are, roughly speaking, equal, but not more than their budgets
allow. The resulting payoﬀ distribution turns out to be a core element of the
related contribution game.
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1 Introduction
In situations where agents work together to achieve a joint project costs or surpluses
frequently have to be allocated. In these cases formulating cost allocation problems as
cost games may prove restrictive since these say nothing about the beneﬁts that players
receive. In particular costs allocated may exceed the beneﬁts received and players might
refuse to pay. Therefore, beneﬁts should be incorporated into the analysis.
Unfortunately, beneﬁts do not have the same objectivity as costs. Sometimes agents try
to misreport their true beneﬁts if this strategy results in lower cost contributions. We
are confronted in this case with a demand revelation problem (See for example Young
(1998)). However, we do not tackle this problem and hereafter we assume that proﬁts
are known and see them as budgets available for the project.
In this paper we deal with situations in which a group of agents aims to work together in
achieving a project. However, the wishes of the agents with respect to the sophistication
level of the project may diﬀer, and also the beneﬁts for players who wish for the same
sophistication level. Notice that beneﬁt is connected with willingness to contribute to
the costs of some realization. Obvious questions in this context are:
Q.1 What will be an optimal sophistication level of the project for the whole group and
for subgroups?
Q.2 What will be the contributions of the involved agents to the cost of the chosen
realization?
Assuming that beneﬁts are known, economic eﬃciency suggests that an optimal so-
phistication level is one that yields the greatest diﬀerence between beneﬁts and costs.
But there is still the question of the allocation of surpluses and, consequently, of the
distribution of costs of the chosen project.
In what follows we illustrate some related economic examples already studied in litera-
ture.
Moulin (1994) considers that any group of potential users can jointly produce a non-rival
and excludable public good with no congestion as long as they cover the costs of the
largest amount of the good demanded. In that paper, where the serial cost method is
analyzed, agents are allowed to consume diﬀerent amounts of the public good, that is if
agent i consumes yi units of the good then any other consumer with the same or a lower
demand can also consume but others may not. There may be reasons that justify this
last restriction. Think for example of a group of people wanting to share a taxi home.
If one person’s demand is not going to be satisﬁed in its totality then he will not be3
interested in the service.
Some other well known economic studies about this type of public facilities are the
following.
The construction of landing strips for the use of diﬀerent types of aircraft discussed by
Littlechild and Thompson (1977) may be considered one of the ﬁrst analysis of cost
sharing of a non-rival public good of this type. Also Young et al. (1982) study the cost
allocation of a water distribution system in Sweden, while the cost allocations of the
system of irrigation ditches in Montana has more recently been analyzed by Aadland
and Kolpin (1998). A numerical example which ilustrates a water distribution system
supplying a group of consumers with independent demands can also be found in Moulin
(1988). In this example the cost structure depends on the number of agents to be served,
and beneﬁts to consumers from using this facility are also incorporated.
Now let us consider a typical economic situation to clarify the idea of sophistication
level that we introduce in this paper.
Suppose two ﬁrms are located along a river. The ﬁrst produces steel while the second
operates a resort hotel somewhere downstream. Both use the river, but in diﬀerent ways.
The steal ﬁrm uses it as a sink for its waste, while the resort uses it to attract customers
seeking water recreation. The establishing of a water treatment system to clean the
river and how to share the costs of this treatment are important issues. Note that here
the agents require diﬀerent levels of cleanness of the water. i.e., diﬀerent degrees of
sophistication are required.
After introducing the model we also consider some proposals for sharing the surplus gen-
erated by projects of this type. Our favorite proposal is a constrained Baker-Thompson
like rule inspired by the landing fee literature (Baker (1965), Thompson (1971), Lit-
tlechild and Owen (1973, 1977), Littlechild and Thompson (1977), Littlechild (1974,
1975), Potters and Sudh¨ olter (1999)). In the paper by Littlechild and Owen (1977)
beneﬁts are also taken into account and no player contributes in costs more than his
beneﬁt.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model of an enter-
prise situation, give some facts on optimal sophistication levels in connection to question
Q.1. and deﬁne a (cooperative) enterprise game useful to tackle question Q.2. Section
3 deals with the convexity problem for such enterprise games. We give a suitable char-
acterization of core elements which plays an important role in the paper; in particular
it is useful in ﬁnding the extreme points of the core, starting with the introduction of
the adjusted Bird rule (Bird (1976)). It concludes that enterprise games are convex4
games. In Section 4 we concentrate on the problem of sharing costs in joint enterprise
situations with asymmetric agents. We consider classical game theoretic solutions and
propose two new rules for allocating surpluses, inspired by airport fee literature. In
Section 5 a (non-cooperative) contribution game related to a joint enterprise situation is
introduced and non-cooperative allocations of surpluses are considered. We prove that
strong Nash equilibria of contribution games correspond to core elements of the related
enterprise games. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Joint enterprise situations and games
A joint enterprise situation (with asymmetric agents) will be in the following the tuple
J = hN, Λ, (di,bi)i∈N, ci
where N = {1,...,n} is the set of agents, Λ = {0,1,...,m} is the set of sophistication
levels; for each i ∈ N, di ∈ Λ\{0} is the demanded sophistication level and bi ∈ I R++
the beneﬁt corresponding to any sophistication level λ ≥ di, and c : Λ → I R is a strict
increasing cost function with c(0) = 0, where c(λ) indicates the cost of realizing a project
with sophistication level λ ∈ Λ. W.l.o.g. we suppose that 1 = d1 ≤ ... ≤ dn = m and
di+1 −di ∈ {0,1} for all i ∈ {1,...,n−1}. Level λ = 0 corresponds to a situation where
there will be realized nothing. An agent i ∈ N confronted with a chosen sophistication
level λ < di will have beneﬁt 0, and hence he is not willing to contribute in the costs.
For sophistication level λ ≥ di agent i wants to contribute at most bi.
Let Ri : Λ → I R be the step function given by Ri(λ) = bi if λ ≥ di and Ri(λ) = 0 if
λ < di. Then Ri(λ) is the revenue for player i if sophistication level λ is chosen. Let
BN : Λ → I R be given by BN(λ) =
n P
i=1
Ri(λ) − c(λ) for each λ ∈ Λ. Then BN(λ) is the
total net beneﬁt obtainable by N if level λ is chosen. The maximal reward obtainable
by N is given by
v(N) = max{BN(λ) : λ ∈ Λ}
and arg max{BN(λ) : λ ∈ Λ} is the set of optimal sophistication levels guaranteeing
v(N). The largest element in this set is denoted by λN. So
λN = max(argmax{BN(λ)|λ ∈ Λ}).
Example 2.15
Let N = {1,2,3}, Λ = {0,1,2}, d = (d1,d2,d3) = (1,1,2), (b1,b2,b3) = (3,12,16) and
c(0) = 0, c(1) = 10, c(2) = 20. Then BN(0) = 0, BN(1) = R1(1)+R2(1)+R3(1)−c(1) =
3+12+0−10 = 5 and BN(2) = R1(2)+R2(2)+R3(2)−c(2) = 3+12+16−20 = 11.
So v(N) = max{0,5,11} = 11. Further λN = 2. In case λN is realized, player 1 can
contribute in the cost x1 ∈ [0,3], player 2: x2 ∈ [0,12] and player 3: x3 ∈ [0,16]. But
it is not realistic to ask from players 1 and 2 together a cost contribution exceeding 10
because alone they can make a facility of their desired sophistication level λ = 1 with
cost 10.
To handle the cost sharing problem it is interesting to look at the cooperative game





The amount v(S) is the reward which can be generated by S when splitting oﬀ and
realizing a sophistication level λS = maxargmax{BS(λ) : λ ∈ Λ}. Note that in this case
the members in N\S cannot use the enterprise realized by S.
Example 2.2
Consider again the joint enterprise situation of Example 2.1. The corresponding en-
terprise game hN,vi is given by N = {1,2,3}, v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = 2, v({3}) = 0,
v({1,2}) = 5, v({1,3}) = 0, v({2,3}) = 8, v({1,2,3}) = 11. The sophistication
levels of the coalitions are given by λ{1} = λ{3} = λ{1,3} = 0, λ{2} = λ{1,2} = 1,
λ{2,3} = λ{1,2,3} = 3.
For further use we conclude this section with some remarks.
Remark 2.1
If more players cooperate then a higher or equal optimal sophistication level is achieved.
Proof.
We have only to show that
λS∪{k} ≥ λS for all S ∈ 2
N and k / ∈ S.
Note that for λ ≤ λS
BS∪{k}(λ) = BS(λ) + Rk(λ) ≤ BS(λS) + Rk(λS) = BS∪{k}(λS),
where we use in the inequality the monotonicity of Rk. Hence λS∪{k} ≥ λS. 6
Remark 2.2
The enterprise game hN,vi is a monotonic game and the marginal contribution of a
player to any coalition does not exceed his beneﬁt.
Proof. This follows from the inequalities
v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ {k}) ≤ v(S) + bk , for all S ∈ 2
N, k / ∈ S.
To prove these inequalities, note that






BS∪{k}(λ) ≤ bk + max
λ∈Λ
BS(λ)
or v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ {k}) ≤ bk + v(S).

Remark 2.3
Suppose λS ≥ 1 for S ∈ 2N. Then there is at least one i ∈ S with di = λS.
Proof.
That the set {i ∈ S : di = λS} is non empty follows from










The ﬁrst inequality follows from Remark 2.2 and the second inequality from the fact
that c is strictly increasing.

Remark 2.4


























Let S ∈ 2N. Deﬁne S0 = {i ∈ S : di ≤ λS}. Then λS0 = λS and v(S0) = v(S).
Proof
Note that λS0 ≤ λS by Remark 2.1. On the other hand, for λ ≤ λS we have BS0(λ) =
BS(λ) ≤ BS(λS) = BS0(λS) implying that λS0 ≥ λS. So λS = λS0 and then v(S) = v(S0)
by Remark 2.4 because {i ∈ S\S0 : di ≤ λS} = ∅.

Remark 2.6
Let S and S0 be as in Remark 2.5 and S00 = {i ∈ N : di ≤ λS}. Then λS = λS00.
Proof
In view of Remark 2.3 we have λS00 ≤ λS = λS0. Since S0 ⊂ S00 we have λS0 ≤ λS00. So
λS00 = λS. 
3 The core and the marginal vectors of an enterprise
game
For a game hN,vi the core C(v) is deﬁned by
C(v) = {x ∈ I R





xi. The core consists of eﬃcient vectors x, where subsets S ⊂ N have
no incentive to split oﬀ because then they only can reach a payoﬀ v(S), which is not
larger that x(S).
For core elements of an enterprise game the following theorem gives a characterization
which will be useful later.
Theorem 3.1
Let hN,vi be the enterprise game corresponding to the situation hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci
where Λ = {1,...,m}. Let, for each k ∈ Λ, Lk be the set {i ∈ N : di ≤ k} of players
with sophistication level at most k. Then the following two assertions are equivalent:
(i) x ∈ C(v)8
(ii) 0 ≤ xi ≤ bi for each i ∈ N, x(Lk) ≥ v(Lk) for each k ∈ Λ, and x(N) = v(N).
Proof
((i) ⇒ (ii)). Take x ∈ C(v). Then xi ≥ v({i}) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N. Further xi =
x(N) − x(N\{i}) ≤ v(N) − v(N\{i}) ≤ bi, where the last inequality follows from
Remark 2.2 with N\{i} in the role of S. The other two conditions are satisﬁed for the
core element x.
((ii) ⇒ (i)). Suppose x ∈ I RN satisﬁes the conditions in (ii). Then x(N) = v(N). Take
S ∈ 2N\{∅}. We have to prove that x(S) ≥ v(S). Deﬁne S0 = S ∩ LλS and S00 = LλS.
Then S0 ⊂ S00, and in view of Remark 2.5 and Remark 2.6 we have λS0 = λS00 = λS
and v(S0) = v(S). Now x(S) ≥ x(S0) = x(S00) − x(S00\S0) ≥ v(S00) − x(S00\S0) =
v(S0)+b(S00\S0) − x(S00\S0) ≥ v(S0) = v(S), where we use in the ﬁrst inequality that
x ≥ 0 and S0 ⊂ S; in the second inequality that S00 = LλS; in the next inequality
Remark 2.4 and in the last inequality that b ≥ x.

Note that the reward sharing vector x = (0,5,6) in Example 2.2 is a core element of
hN,vi corresponding to the following contributions to the cost 20 = c(2) of the project:
player 1 pays b1 = 3, player 2 pays 12−5 = 7 and player 3 pays 16−6 = 10 = c(2)−c(1).
One can easily check that for this vector the inequalities in (ii) are satisﬁed. Now, note
that y = (4,4,3) is not in the core because y2+y3 = 7 < v({2,3}). Also for y = (4,4,3)
all inequalities of (ii) are satisﬁed except y1 ≤ b1.
Let Π(N) be the set of n! orderings of the player set N. For each σ ∈ Π(N) we
introduce two vectors: the cost vector kσ ∈ I RN and the gain vector gσ ∈ I RN, for
which the diﬀerence gσ − kσ will turn out to be a core element of hN,vi. The sum of








bi, the sum of the beneﬁts if λN is chosen. Take σ ∈ Π(N) and let
Tr = {σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(r)}, lr = λTr for each r ∈ {1,...,n} and T0 = ∅. Consider the
situation where the grand coalition N forms by sequential joining of players: σ(1) ﬁrst,
then σ(2) etc. Then also the sophistication level gradually increases from 0 to m for
the sets ∅, T1, T2,...,Tn. Players who enter and increase the sophistication level will take
care of the cost increase and obtain at most their own beneﬁt. Let us consider three
possibilities when σ(r) joins Tr−1:
(i) lr > lr−1. Then dσ(r) = lr. In this case kσ




s ≤ r, dσ(s) ∈ (lr−1,lr]}, which is the sum of the own beneﬁt bσ(r) and the beneﬁts9
of the players who joined earlier but found in the coalition a sophistication level
below their desired level.
(ii) lr = lr−1 and dσ(r) > lr. In this case kσ
σ(r) = 0 (= c(lr) − c(lr−1)), and gσ
σ(r) = 0.
(iii) lr = lr−1 and dσ(r) ≤ lr. In this case kσ
σ(r) = 0 (= c(lr) −c(lr−1)), and gσ
σ(r) = bσ(r).
Summarizing, for each r ∈ {1,2,...,n}
(3.1) k
σ











bσ(s) if lr > lr−1
0 if lr = lr−1 < dσ(r)
bσ(r) if lr = lr−1 ≥ dσ(r)
which can be summarized as follows
(3.2) g
σ




bσ(s), for all r ∈ {1,...,n},
where we deﬁne a sum over an empty set as 0.
The next theorem describes the relation between kσ and gσ and the marginal vector





σ(r)(v) = v({σ(1),...,σ(r)}) − v({σ(1),...,σ(r − 1)}).
Theorem 3.2
















From (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) we obtain10
mσ




bσ(k) and using now (3.1) and






In some economic situations including airport situations one can start with a project of
low level of sophistication and let the sophistication level increase with growing popu-
lation of users. The adjustment of cost by going from λ to λ0 should be described by
c(λ0) − c(λ) (and no extra cost). In such a case a nice economic interpretation can be
given to kσ and gσ.
In the following we want to prove that for the enterprise games all marginal vectors
are in the core. The way we do it is as follows. First we show in Proposition 3.1 that
mσ0(v) is in the core where, σ0 = (1,2,...,n). We call this vector the Bird allocation
(Bird (1976)) and denote it by Bi(v). Then we use the fact that each σ ∈ Π(N) can be
obtained from σ0 by neighbor switching in which one neighbor pair (i,j) with i < j is
involved. Lemma 3.1 is then the key for theorem together with our characterization of
core elements in Theorem 3.1. First we give an example.
Example 3.1
Consider the game of Example 2.2. The Bird allocation is given by Bi(v) = (0,5,6)
and we have already noted that Bi(v) ∈ C(v). By switching the neighbors 2 and 3 in
σ0 = (1,2,3) one arrives at σ1 = (1,3,2) and mσ1 = (0,11,0) is also a core element.
The ordering σ2 = (3,1,2) can be obtained from σ1 by the neighbor switch of 1 and 3.
Also mσ2 = (0,11,0) is a core element as well as m(3,2,1) = (3,8,0) etc.
We can consider the directed graph with the elements of Π({1,2,3}) as nodes and arc
between two orderings σ and τ if and only if τ can be obtained from σ by a neighbor
switch of i and j where i < j.













3. For example, for σ = (2,3,1) and τ = (3,2,1)
obtainable by switching 2 and 3 we have 3 ≤ mσ
1 ≤ mτ







Bi(v) ∈ C(v) for any enterprise game hN,vi.
Proof11
In view of Theorem 3.1 this follows from the fact that for each i ∈ N, Bii(v) =
v({1,...,i})−v({1,...,i−1}) ∈ [0,bi] by Remark 2.2;
n P
i=1






(v({1,...,i}) − v({1,...,i − 1})) = v({1,...,k}) − v(∅) = v({1,...,k}) for each k ∈ N.

Lemma 3.1
Suppose σ ∈ Π(N) with σ(k) < σ(k + 1) and mσ(v) ∈ C(v). Let τ ∈ Π(N) be the
ordering with τ(k) = σ(k+1), τ(k+1) = σ(k) and τ(r) = σ(r) for each r ∈ N\{k,k+1}.
Then mτ(v) ∈ C(v).
Proof
Put σ(k) = i, σ(k + 1) = j. Note that
(1) mσ
σ(r)(v) = mσ
τ(r)(v) for each r ∈ N\{k,k + 1},
(2) mσ
i (v) + mσ
j(v) = mτ
i(v) + mτ
j(v), because the left side and the right side of (2)
are both equal to v({σ(1),...,σ(k),σ(k + 1)})v({σ(1),...,σ(k − 1)}). In view of
(2) and Theorem 3.1 if is suﬃcient to prove that
(3) mσ












for each k ∈ N.
To prove (3) let S = {σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(k − 1)}. Consider the following three cases:
λS = λS∪{j} < dj, λS = λS∪{j} ≥ dj and λS ≤ λS∪{j} = dj.
If λS = λS∪{j} < dj, then mτ
j(v) = v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) = 0 ≤ mσ
j(v).
If λS = λS∪{j} ≥ dj, then dj ≥ di implies that mσ
i (v) = mτ
i(v) = bi.
If λS ≤ λS∪{j} = dj then mτ
i(v) = v(S ∪ {i,j}) − v(S ∪ {j}) = bi ≥ mσ
i (v).
where the second equality follows from di ≤ dj = λS∪{j}.

Now we come to the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3
Let hN,vi be an enterprise game. Then
(i) For each σ ∈ Π(N) it holds that mσ ∈ C(v)
(ii) hN,vi is a convex game12




mσ(v) is a core element.
Proof
(i) follows from Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1, because each σ can be reached from
σ0 by neighbor switches where a player with a larger index comes earlier, and
mσ0(v) ∈ C(v).
(ii) follows from the well-known fact (Ichiishi (1983)) that a game is convex if and
only if all marginal vectors are in the core.
(iii) is a direct consequence of (i) and the fact that C(v) is convex.

This theorem implies many interesting properties for solutions.
4 Cost allocation rules for joint projects
Of course, there are many ways to allocate the costs in a joint project. We describe
some interesting possibilities.
One way is to apply on the corresponding cooperative games a solution concept ψ
from cooperative game theory. If hN,vi corresponds to J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci, then
bi − ψi(v) is the cost which player i ∈ N contributes. If we consider the Shapley value
(Shapley (1953)), then φ(v) is a central core element of hN,vi, which follows from the
fact that hN,vi is a convex game. (Shapley (1971)). See also Theorem 3.3.
For convex games the τ-value (Tijs (1981)) is also attractive. For such games the
calculation of the τ-value is easy: the k-th coordinate of τ(v) is then given by
τk(v) = αv
∗({k}) + (1 − α)v({k}),




However, for n > 5 the τ-value may be an element outside the core (Driessen, Tijs
(1985)) as Example 4.1 shows. A separate paper (Branzei et al. (2002)) is devoted to
the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) of enterprise games.
Our allocation rule β, which we propose now, is inspired by the airport fee literature
(Baker (1965), Thompson (1971); Littlechild and Thompson (1977)).13
The idea of Baker and Thompson for the cost allocation of airport strips is that only
users of a piece of the strip contribute to the cost of that piece and each of the users
contributes an equal part. Translating this to our problem J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci with
sophistication level λN, each cost c(r)−c(r−1) for a level increase from r−1 to r with
r 6 λN is divided equally among the set Hr = {i ∈ N : r 6 di 6 λN} of agents who are









i(J) for i ∈ LλN
0 for i ∈ N with di > λN
where δr(J) ∈ Rn is such that δr
i(J) = |Hr|−1(c(r) − c(r − 1)) for i ∈ Hr and δr
i(J) = 0
otherwise.
In case we have a joint enterprise J with large beneﬁts, Theorem 4.1 shows that the
Shapley value of the corresponding cooperative game is easy to calculate and coincides
with β(J). In the proof we use dual unanimity games hN,u∗
Si for S ⊂ N with u∗
S(T) = 1
if S ∩ T 6= ∅ and u∗
S(T) = 0 otherwise. Further hN,uii is the game with ui(T) = 1 if
i ∈ T and ui(T) = 0 otherwise, so ui = u∗
{i}. It is well-known that the Shapley value
φ(u∗
S) is equal to |S|−1eS, where eS ∈ Rn is the characteristic vector of S, with eS
i = 1
if i ∈ S, eS
i = 0 if i / ∈ S.
Theorem 4.1 (Joint projects with large beneﬁts).
Suppose that for a joint enterprise situation J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci with N = {1,2,...,n}
and Λ = {1,2,...,m} we have
c(di) 6 bi for each i ∈ N (large beneﬁt condition).







(c(r) − c(r − 1))u∗
Mr, where Mr = {i ∈ N : di > r}
(ii) φ(v) = b −
m P
r=1
|Mr|−1(c(r) − c(r − 1))eMr
(iii) β(J) = φ(v).
Proof
(i) Take S ∈ 2N\{∅}. First we show that in view of the large beneﬁt condition it is
optimal for S to realize a sophistication level λS = max{di : i ∈ S}. This follows because14

















bi(S) > c(di(S)) > c(di(S))−c(λ), where the large beneﬁt condition is applied in the second






Ri(λ)−c(λ) = BS(λ). Hence, we have










biui(S). Further Mr∩S 6=
∅ iﬀ r 6 λS iﬀ u∗














(c(r) − c(r − 1))φ(u∗
Mr) = b −
m P
r=1
|Mr|−1(c(r) − c(r − 1))eMr.









c(r − 1)) = βi(J), because λN = m, Mr = Hr. 
Example 4.1
Consider the joint enterprise situation J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci, where N = {1,2,3,4,5},
Λ = {0,1,2,}, di = 1, bi = 20 for i ∈ {1,2,3}, di = 2, bi = 110 for i ∈ {4,5} and
c(0) = 0, c(1) = 10, c(2) = 90. This is a situation with large beneﬁts because c(di) 6 bi
for each i ∈ N, implying that λS = max{di : i ∈ S} for each S ⊂ N. By Theorem 4.1,




N − (c(2) − c(1))u∗
{4,5} =
20(u1 +u2 +u3)+110(u4 +u5)−10u∗
N −80u∗
{4,5}. From this it follows that the Shapley
value φ(v) is equal to (18,18,18,68,68). The Baker-Thompson like allocation β(J) we
obtain from b − δ1(J) − δ2(J) = (b1,b2,b3,b4,b5) − 10
5 eN − 80
2 e{4,5} = (18,18,18,68,68)
and it is equal to φ(v), which is in accordance with Theorem 4.1. To calculate the







and v({i}) = bi − c(i) = 20 − 10 if i ∈ {1,2,3} and v({i}) = 110 − 90 = 20 if










τi(v) < 50 = v({1,2,3}), so τ(v) / ∈ C(v).







Consider the joint enterprise situation J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci, where N = {1,2},
Λ = {0,1,2}, d1 = 1, b1 = 3, d2 = 2, b2 = 25, c(0) = 0, c(1) = 10, c(2) = 22.
Then player 1 has a small beneﬁt: b1 = 3 < c(1) = 10. For the corresponding game hN,vi15
we have v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = 3 and v({1,2}) = 6, so v = 3u{2} + 3u{1,2}. The Shapley
value φ(v) = (11
2,41
2) is unequal to the allocation β(J) = (3,25) − (5,5) − (0,12) =
(−2,8). Note that β1(J) = −2 < 0, so β(J) / ∈ C(v), and β(J) is not an attractive
allocation. The allocation rule βc, which we introduce soon, takes into account that
player 1 with beneﬁt 3 cannot contribute 1
2b1 = 5 in the costs c(1) − c(0).
In this subsection we introduce a new allocation rule βc, based still on the Baker-
Thompson principle that only players contribute to the cost c(r)−c(r −1) of a raise in
sophistication level from r to r+1, who are interested in such a raise, and where, roughly
speaking, these contributions are as equal as possible but never larger than the beneﬁt
which a player can obtain from such raises. The contribution to level raises will be
determined sequentially in n steps starting with the highest level raise, then the second
highest level raise, etc. In each step the beneﬁts will be adjusted taking into account
the contribution in costs in earlier steps. To avoid technical obstacles we suppose in
this subsection that the sophistication level of the grand coalition is equal to max(Λ),
or λN = m if Λ = {1,2,...,m}. Note that this does not harm the generality because in
a joint enterprise situation where λN < max(Λ) the players with λ > λN play a dummy
role and can be removed from the problem.
Note further that




bi > c(m) − c(k − 1)
(where Mk = {i ∈ N : di > k}).
So, λN = m iﬀ for each k ∈ Λ the players in Mk can cover the costs c(m) − c(k − 1) of
a raise in sophistication level from k − 1 to m.
To give a smooth formal introduction of βc it is convenient to introduce the notions of
feasible simple cost sharing problem and of constrained equal cost sharing vectors for
such a problem. Let us call a quadruplet hN,b,c,Si a simple cost sharing problem if
N = {1,2,...,n}, ∅ 6= S ⊂ N, b ∈ Rn
+, c ∈ R+. It corresponds to a situation, where a
cost c has to be covered by a non-empty subset S of the player set N, where one has to
take into account not to exceed the available budgets, where bi is the budget of player
i. Such a simple cost sharing problem hN,b,c,Si is called feasible if
P
i∈S
bi > c, i.e. if the
total budget of the players in S is suﬃcient to cover the involved cost.
Note that for a feasible cost sharing problem hN,b,c,Si there is a unique real number
α ∈ [0,maxi∈S bi], such that
P
i∈S
min{bi,α} = c. The constrained equal cost sharing16
vector is then the vector ε(N,b,c,S) ∈ I Rnwith εi(N,b,c,S) = 0 for i ∈ N\S, and
εi(N,b,c,S) = min{bi,α} for i ∈ S. This vector corresponds to a cost sharing of c by
members of S only, where the players in S with budget higher than α pay α and the
others spend their whole budget to cover the cost.
Example 4.3
Let N = {1,2,3,4}, S = {3,4}, b(1) = (2,6,0,18), b(2) = (2,6,5,25), c(1) = 10 and
c(2) = 12. Then ε(N,b(2),c(2),S) = (0,0,5,7) and ε(N,b(1),c(1),N) = (2,4,0,4).
Let J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci be a joint enterprise situation with Λ = {1,2,...,m} and
λN = m. Consider the sequence of m feasible (Lemma 4.1) and interrelated simple
cost sharing problems Pm,Pm−1,...,P1 with P(m) = hN,b(m),c(m) − c(m − 1),Mmi,
Pm−1 = hN,b(m − 1),c(m − 1) − c(m − 2), Mm−1i,..., P2 = hN,b(2),c(2) − c(1),M2i,
P1 = hN,b(1),c(1) − c(0),M1i, where b(m) = b, and for r < m : b(r) = b(r+1)−ε(Pr+1).




So, βc assigns to J a vector where the i-th coordinate is equal to the beneﬁt bi minus
the contributions of i in costs in the m simple cost sharing problems.
Important is the feasibility of each problem Pr, because otherwise we cannot deﬁne
ε(Pr). This feasibility is proved in
Lemma 4.1
Let J,P1,P2,...,Pm be as above. The P1,P2,...,Pm are feasible simple cost sharing
problems.
Proof




bi > c(m)−c(m−1). For each k ∈ {1,...,m−1} for which Pk+1,...,Pm
are feasible, we have to prove that Pk is feasible. Take such a k.
Note that







bi(m) > c(m) − c(k − 1)17
where (b) follows from the fact that m = λN. Then
X
i∈Mk












= c(m) − c(k − 1) −
m X
r=k+1
(c(r) − c(r − 1)) = c(k) − c(k − 1).
Hence, Pk is feasible.

Example 4.4
Let J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci, where N = {1,2,3,4}, Λ = {1,2}, b1 = 2, b2 = 6, b3 = 5,
b4 = 25, d1 = d2 = 1, d3 = d4 = 2, c(1) = 10 and c(2) = 22.
Then P2 = hN,(2,6,5,25),12,{3,4}i, ε(P2) = (0,0,5,7), and P1 = hN,(2,6,5,25)−
(0,0,5,7),10,{1,2}i, ε(P1) = (2,4,0,4). Hence βc(J) = b−ε(P2)−ε(P1) = (0,2,0,14).
Note that βc(J) is a core element of the cooperative game corresponding to J.
While β(J) was not necessarily a core element of the related cooperative game, βc(J) is
always a member of the core as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 4.2
Let J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci be a joint enterprise situation with λN = m = max(Λ) and
let hN,vi be the corresponding cooperative game. Then
(i) βc(J) ∈ C(v)
(ii) if bi > c(di) for all i ∈ N, then βc(J) = β(J) = φ(v).
Proof
(i) We prove (i) using Theorem 3.1, so we have to prove for x = βc(J): (a) x(N) =
v(N), (b) 0 6 xi 6 bi for each i ∈ N and (c) x(Lk) > v(Lk) for each k ∈ Λ.
















(c(r) − c(r − 1)) =
P
i∈N
bi − c(λN) = v(N).
(b) From bi = bi(m) > bi(m − 1) > ... > bi(1) > βc
i(J) > 0 follows that
βc
i(J) ∈ [0,bi] for each i ∈ N.18
(c) Take k ∈ {1,2,...,m}. Let ¯ Lk = {i ∈ Lk : di 6 λLk}. Then v(Lk) =
P
i∈¯ Lk





























(c(r) − c(r − 1)) =
P
i∈¯ Lk
bi − c(λLk) = v(Lk).
(ii) In case of high beneﬁts we have ε(Pr) = |Mr|−1(c(r) − c(r − 1)) for each r ∈
{1,2,...,m}. So βc
i(L) = bi −
m P
r=1




Further, by Theorem 4.1, β(L) = φ(v).

We like to conclude this section with the remark that in our opinion the βc rule is an
attractive allocation scheme for joint projects. It is based on sound economic principles
and it leads to a stable reward allocation, which, moreover, equals the Shapley value of
the related cooperative game in case the beneﬁts for the players are high.
5 Non-cooperative contribution games for joint en-
terprise situations
In this section we describe a strategic (non-cooperative) approach to a joint enterprise
situation, which can be useful to solve the problem of choosing a suitable sophistication
level as well as the cost sharing problem connected with the realized sophistication level.
In this approach the members involved in the joint enterprise decide independently what
they will contribute to each of the possible m level increases, from 0 to 1, from 1 to
2, ..., from m − 1 to m, where Λ = {1,2,...,m}. They deliver the contribution vector
describing their wishes to the central planner and also the corresponding amount of




m) ∈ I Rm
+, where ui
λ is the amount of money which player i hands in as
a contribution to raise the sophistication level from λ − 1 to λ. Suppose players 1, 2,




λ for the raise from λ−1 to λ is smaller than the cost c(λ)−c(λ−1),
then this raise is not realized and also not the higher raises: from λ to λ+1,... Players
never get money back, neither if the joint contribution to a raise is insuﬃcient nor if the19
total contribution exceeds the cost of the raise. Given a strategy proﬁle u = (u1,...,un)
of contribution vectors, the sophistication level which will be realized is given by





β ≥ c(β) − c(β − 1) for all β ≤ λ}.
The corresponding payoﬀ for player i, given contribution proﬁle u, is described by





λ, for i ∈ N
i.e. the payoﬀ for player i corresponding to the realized sophistication level λ(u) minus
the contributed costs. Formally this leads to the non-cooperative game Γ(J), correspond-
ing to the joint enterprise situation J = hN,Λ,(di,bi)i∈N,ci with N = {1,2,...,n},
Λ = {1,2,...,m}, with Γ(J) = hN,S1,S2,...,Sn,Π1,Π2,...,Πni, where N is the set of
players; for each i ∈ N the strategy set Si equals I Rm
+, the set of possible contribution
vectors; and the payoﬀ function Πi is given by (5.1) for each u ∈ (I Rm
+)n. The game Γ(J)
is called the contribution game associated to J. In the following we are interested in
Nash equilibria (NE) and strong Nash equilibria (SNE) of the game Γ(J). A Nash equi-
librium for Γ(J) is a strategy proﬁle (ui)i∈N, where unilateral deviation of a player does
not pay. A strong Nash equilibrium for Γ(J) is a strategy proﬁle u such that no coalition
S can deviate and obtain a payoﬀ at least as large as Πi(u) for each of its members and
more for at least one of its members. So u ∈ (I Rm
+)n is a SNE if there is no S ⊂ N with
a strategy proﬁle ¯ uS = (¯ ui)i∈S such that Πi(¯ uS,uN\S) ≥ Πi(uS,uN\S) = Πi(u) for each
i ∈ S and where at least one inequality is strict. The objective of the rest of this section
is to show that for each SNE of Γ(J) the corresponding payoﬀs to the players form a core
element of the corresponding cooperative enterprise game v; and, conversely, that each
core element of the enterprise game is achieved via payoﬀs related to at least one SNE
of Γ(J). To obtain these results we need three lemmas. But ﬁrst we give an example.
Example 5.1. Let J = hN,Λ,(di, bi)i∈N, ci be the joint enterprise situation where N =
{1,2,3},Λ = {0,1,2},d = (1,1,2),b = (4,12,10),c(0) = 0,c(1) = 10 and c(2) = 20.
For the contribution game Γ(J) the strong Nash equilibria u = ((3,0),(7,0),(0,0)) and
˜ u = ((4,0),(6,0),(0,10)) correspond to the core elements (4−3,12−7,0−0) = (1,5,0)
and (0,6,0), respectively, of the enterprise game hN,vi with v(∅) = v({1}) = v({3}) =
v({1,3}) = 0, v({2}) = v({2,3}) = 2, and v({1,2}) = v({1,2,3}) = 6. Given the
core element (1,5,0) above (which corresponded to the SNE u) another strong Nash
equilibrium ((3,0),(7,0),(0,10)) is found if we use the method described in the proof of20
Proposition 5.2.
Lemma 5.1 Let u = (ui)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the contribution game Γ(J).
Then for every i ∈ N we have
(i) 0 ≤ Πi(u) ≤ bi, for each i ∈ N
(ii) di < λ implies ui
λ = 0
(iii) λ(u) < di implies ui = (0,0,...,0)
(iv) λ(u) < λ implies ui
λ = 0.
Proof
(i) It is obvious from (5.1) that Πi(u) ≤ bi for each i ∈ N. Suppose that there exists a
player i ∈ N such that Πi(u) < 0. Then player i could unilaterally deviate by choosing
the strategy ˜ ui = (0,...,0) and he will receive at least 0 independently of what the



















where λ(u−i, ˜ ui) ≤ λ(u). Then Πi(u−i, ˜ ui) ≥ Πi(u), that is u is not a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Note that if ui
λ > 0 for some λ > di, then player i could unilaterally deviate by








α if α 6= λ
0 if α = λ.





α > Πi(u). This is in contradiction with the assumption
that u is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) Suppose λ(u) < di and ui
λ > 0 for some λ ∈ Λ. Then Πi(u) < 0 and this is a
contradiction with (i). So λ(u) < di implies ui
λ = 0.
(iv) Suppose λ > λ(u) and ui
λ > 0. Take ˜ ui = (˜ ui
α)α∈Λ as in (ii) and player i improves.












α ≤ c(λ), for every λ ∈ Λ, with equality if λ ≤ λ(u).
Proof
(i) Let λ ∈ Λ and k =
P
i∈N ui
λ − (c(λ) − c(λ − 1)). If k > 0 there exists (at least)
one player i ∈ N for which ui
λ > 0, and then for this player it would exist a proﬁtable








α if α 6= λ
max{0,ui
λ − k} if α = λ.
The equality sign for λ ≤ λ(u) follows from the deﬁnition of λ(u).
(ii) It is a straightforward consequence of (i).

Lemma 5.3. Let u be a strong Nash equilibrium of Γ(J) and let β ∈ Λ\{0,1,2,...,λ(u)},
Tβ = {i ∈ N : λ(u) < di ≤ β}. Then
(i) c(β) − c(λ(u)) ≥
P
i∈Tβ bi
(ii) c(λN) − c(λ(u)) =
P
i∈TλN bi if λN > λ(u).
Proof (i) Suppose, for a moment, that for some β ∈ (λ(u),m]




We show that then u cannot be a SNE of Γ(J). Given the inequality (5.2) it is possible
to ﬁnd a matrix (vi
α)i∈Tβ, α∈(λ(u), β] such that
(5.3) vi








α ≤ bi, for all i ∈ Tβ.
To ﬁnd such a matrix one can use e.g. an algorithm from the theory of transportation,
since the above problem can be seen as a simple transportation situation, where the
players i ∈ Tβ are suppliers with supply bi and where the levels α ∈ (λ(u),β] are
demand points with demand c(α)−c(α−1). By (5.2) the total supply exceeds the total22
demand, so all demanders can be completely satisﬁed and there is (at least) one supplier







Consider now the strategy proﬁle (uN\Tβ, ¯ uTβ) = ((ui)i∈N\Tβ,(¯ ui)i∈Tβ) where the players
in Tβ deviate from u as follows: ¯ ui
α = vi
α if i ∈ Tβ,α ∈ (λ(u),β] and ¯ ui
α = 0, otherwise.
Then, by (5.4), λ(uN\Tβ, ¯ uTβ) ≥ β and Πi(uN\Tβ, ¯ uTβ) ≥ Πi(u) = 0 for all i ∈ Tβ and
with strict inequality for i∗, by (5.6). So ¯ uTβ is an improvement, u is not a SNE.
(ii) In case β = λN > λ(u), we obtain from (i) that c(λN) − c(λ(u)) ≥
P
i∈TλN bi. The
converse inequality follows from (4.1) because β = λN. 
Proposition 5.1 Let Γ(J) and hN,vi be the contribution game and the enterprise game,
respectively, corresponding to the joint enterprise situation J. Let u be a strong Nash
equilibrium of Γ(J) and z ∈ I Rn the vector with zi = Πi(u) for each i ∈ N. Then
z ∈ C(v).
Proof To prove that z ∈ C(v) we will use the characterization of core elements in
Theorem 3.1.
(i) Note that 0 ≤ zi ≤ bi for each i ∈ N follows from Lemma 5.1.(i).
(ii)Take k ∈ Λ. Note that it follows from Lemma 5.3.(i) that there is an optimal level
k0 for Lk with k0 ≤ λ(u) and hence





Using respectively Lemma 5.1.(i), the deﬁnition of zi, Lemma 5.1.(ii) and the fact that

























λ). Using Lemma 5.2.(ii) the right hand term is
equal to
P
i∈Lk0 bi − c(k0) = v(Lk). So
P
i∈Lk zi ≥ v(Lk) for each k ∈ Λ.
(iii) The proof of the eﬃciency
P
i∈N zi = v(N) runs along similar lines as (ii) after
remarking that in view of Lemma 5.3. the level λ(u) is an optimal sophistication level
for the grand coalition N. 
Proposition 5.2 Let x = (x1,...,xn) be a payoﬀ vector in the core of v. Then there
exists a proﬁle of strategies u, such that Πi(u) = xi for every i ∈ N.
Proof
Deﬁne inductively ui
α in the following way:23
un
m = min{c(m) − c(m − 1),bn − xn},
un
α = min{c(α) − c(α − 1),(bn − xn −
P
β>α un
β)+} if α < m.
And if i < n deﬁne
ui
α = 0 if α > di,
ui
α = min{c(α) − c(α − 1) −
P
j>i uj




We show that u is a SNE. First we prove that
P
i∈N ui
a = c(α) − c(α − 1), for every
α ∈ Λ. By deﬁnition it is clear that
P
i∈N ui
a ≤ c(α) − c(α − 1). Assume that this
inequality was strict. In this case
P
α∈Λ ui











(bi − xi) = c(m),
where the equality follows by taking into account that
P
i∈N xi = v(N) =
P
i∈N bi−c(m).
And this would be in contradiction with our assumption that u is a SNE.
Now if a player i changes his strategy by paying strictly less, it has to be done in a level
lower than di and then this level will not be realized and he will not obtain a higher
payoﬀ. And if he pays more in a level, his beneﬁt will be reduced in this amount. 
Combining Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 we obtain
Theorem 1 Every strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) of the contribution game corresponds
to one element in the core of the related enterprise game, and conversely, each core
element of the enterprise game corresponds to payoﬀs of at least one SNE.
6 Concluding Remarks
We related to each joint enterprise situation a cooperative enterprise game and a strate-
gic contribution game. The characterization in Theorem 3.1 of core elements of the
enterprise game played a crucial role at several parts of this paper. To mention three
places: in the proof of the convexity of the enterprise game; in the description of the
relation between core elements of the enterprise game and strong Nash equilibrium pay-
oﬀs of the contribution game; further to prove that the rule βc leads to core elements of
the enterprise game (Theorem 4.2).
Let us mention some issues for possible further research.
• In this paper there is a natural linear order on the set Λ = {1,2,...,m} of so-
phistication levels. It will be interesting to consider joint projects where Λ is a24
partially ordered set. In case this partially ordered set leads to a tree many of the
results in this paper can be extended.
• In this paper the reward function Ri : Λ → I R is a step function. It would be
interesting to consider weakenings of this condition and see what are the conse-
quences.
• In Section 4 the rule βc was constructed by considering a sequence of m interrelated
simple cost sharing problems and using the constrained equal cost sharing rule for
these problems. Of course, other rules for such simple cost sharing problems can
also be used and can generate in a similar way interesting stable rules for joint
enterprise situations.
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